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Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"

CONFRONTING GOVERNMENTAL IMPUNITY
AND IMMUNITY “FROM BELOW”
Lawrence G. Albrecht*
I. INTRODUCTION
The hierarchy of judicial doctrines advancing governmental
immunity has created a legal thicket of obstacles for civil and international
human rights victims to overcome. 1 Powerful policy pronouncements
often accompany judicial decisions dismissing or limiting such
litigation—policy that reinforces and often expands judicial absolution of
alleged civil and human rights abuses. Impunity or qualified immunity
may triumph regardless of the egregiousness of governmental conduct.
Missing from this immunity architecture is fulsome judicial consideration
of the legal interests of victims of injustice and public policy factors
supporting a more balanced and inclusive legal framework. This missing
law circumscribes consideration of unsettled or novel constitutional and
statutory interpretation and embedded policy assessed from the plaintiff’s
perspective and impedes the development of law responsive to new
realities.
The primary focus of this Article is the quest for judicial recognition
of this perspective “from below” in the context of qualified immunity
challenges to civil and human rights quests for justice.2 First, the judicial
doctrine of qualified immunity and its inherent policy underpinnings
biased toward the defendant’s perspective will be addressed. 3 Several
significant civil rights cases applying core qualified immunity principles
*
J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law (1973). President of First, Albrecht & Blondis,
S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The opportunity to present the 2017 Rucker Lecture was a deep
honor for the author who is ever thankful to return to his academic home since 1965. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Bryn I. Baker, J.D., and Alexa C.
Bradley, J.D., Marquette University Law School (2018), associate attorneys at First, Albrecht
& Blondis, S.C.
1
Related judicial gate-closing doctrines will also be addressed as pertinent to the overall
immunity focus.
2
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 17 (Eberhard Bethge ed.,
Macmillan 1972). The Article’s title expressly references the perspective of a 1942 Christmas
essay sent by Lutheran pastor, theologian, and anti-Nazi co-conspirator Dietrich Bonhoeffer
to family and friends in which he stated: “We have for once learn[ed] to see the great events
of world history from below, from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated,
the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled—in short, from the perspective of those who
suffer.” Id. (emphasis added). Analogous scientific “bottom-up” thinking may “proceed
from the influence of interpreted experience to the formulation of theoretical
understanding,” in contrast to foundationalist “top-down thinking,” which descends from
the power of pre-existing rules and general principles applied to particular contexts. JOHN
POLKINGHORNE, EXPLORING REALITY 93 (Yale Univ. Press 2005).
3
See infra Part II.
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will also be analyzed.4 Second, recent international human rights
decisions by the Supreme Court and other federal courts will be analyzed
to ascertain how the judiciary has responded to specific Congressional
enactments, which frame the universal tension between governmental
immunity and remedies for civil and human rights violations. 5 As
pertinent, principles derived from international human rights law, which
exhibit a remedial policy approach supporting judicial doctrines
advancing justice “from below,” will be referenced.6 An implicit concern
throughout this Article is the broadest question of how to assess the
measure of justice available in an entangled world in which the United
States’ judiciary is confronted with unique civil and human rights crises,
but judicial remedies are foreclosed by doctrines that orchestrate a quick
judicial side-step.
Viewed within a broad bipolar international legal philosophy lens, the
prominence of immunity doctrines—including qualified immunity,
which globally shields state U.S. actors from legal accountability for their
conduct—is consistent with the core philosophy of legal positivism, which
reached its zenith in German law under the Nazis. 7 Positive law forecloses
consideration of natural law or ethical or moral values to determine
whether exercises of governmental power may be judicially constrained.
As a counter-focus, principles of justice “from below” generally align with
the fundamental tenets of natural law theology and philosophy associated
with Thomas Aquinas (and Aristotle and related Greek philosophy),
which promote contemporary judicial openness to human rights values,
whether expressly codified or implied under relevant constitutional,

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.
6
The author is mindful, of course, of the limited U.S. focus on human rights in this Article
and affirms the perspective of Nobel Peace Prize winner and former East Timorese leader
José Ramos-Horta: “Human rights were not a European invention []. For thousands of years,
while Europeans were still living in caves, concepts of human rights and justice were already
articulated in the teachings of the major Eastern philosophies and traditions.” Seth Mydans,
Letter From Asia; In a Contest of Cultures, East Embraces West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/12/world/letter-from-asia-in-a-contest-of-cultureseast-embraces-west.html [https://perma.cc/U6AR-P7RH].
7
Carl Schmitt, the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich,” famously wrote: “The Führer
protects justice against the worst abuse when he in the moment of danger by force of his
leadership status as highest judicial authority creates justice directly.” Detlev Vagts, Carl
Schmitt’s Ultimate Emergency: The Night of the Long Knives, 87 GERMANIC REV. 203, 206 (2012).
See generally MICHAEL BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, 212–17 (2016)
(analyzing Carl Schmitt and the “State of exception,” which further empowers executive
conduct during times of self-declared crisis). At its logical end, such crises may result in the
paradox of suspending the Constitution to save the Constitution. Impunity facilitates this
path to perdition.
4
5
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statutory, or common law principles.8 Aquinas taught that God’s act of
bestowing natural law, as a subset of eternal law, was one aspect of divine
providence and that natural law “constitutes the principles of practical
rationality” by which human conduct is deemed reasonable or
Natural law encompasses the wisdom of human
unreasonable.9
experience, which also resonates with legal pragmatism. 10 William
Blackstone, historically the most influential English legal mind, firmly
believed in natural law and asserted that any man-made law lacks validity
if contrary thereto.11 Indeed, the natural law philosophy of inalienable
rights is enshrined in The Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”12
Invocation of this bipolar legal framework is intended to illustrate the
vast chasm between the perspectives of the parties in the specific cases
analyzed herein and to provoke fresh insights for future development of
civil and human rights law. These competing philosophical and moral
polarities, particularly prominent in twentieth-century European legal
The author’s perspective has been influenced by perusal of various Scottish academic
Gifford Lectures on natural theology and “bottom-up” thinking. JOHN C. POLKINGHORNE,
THE FAITH OF A PHYSICIST: REFLECTIONS OF A BOTTOM-UP THINKER 27 (Fortress Press 1994).
See Gifford Lectures, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifford_Lectures
[https://perma.cc/DEN3-6ZWS]. For a detailed introduction to natural law principles, see
generally The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 27, 2011),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/
[https://perma.cc/E877-97HB]
[hereinafter Natural Law]. For a self-described “Ur-history” of natural rights focused on
developments in the early Middle Ages starting in the twelfth century, see generally Brian
Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and Persistence, 2 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2004),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol2/iss1/2 [https://perma.cc/
FVW5-XKXN]. Of course, detailed examination of these three legal philosophies is beyond
the scope of this Article’s framing analysis.
9
Natural Law, supra note 8. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY AND POLITICS,
50–52 (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan trans., Hackett 2003).
10
See BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 220–25 (addressing the transformation of legal philosopher
Gustav Radbruch from a positivist to a quasi-naturalist perspective, as is reflected in the
“Radbruchsche Formal” that extreme injustice is not law). This theme was also central to the
famous Hart-Fuller debate during the 1950–60s, which Bazyler also summarizes. Id.
11
See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BOOK 2,
40 (1793). Contemporary England understands that the American Revolutionary War was
fought, in part, to defend “natural law and the inalienable rights of man.” The American
Revolution Revisited, ECONOMIST (June 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2017/06/29/the-american-revolution-revisited [https://perma.cc/Z9LE-CSAC].
12
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This also aligns with the
French historical perspective that the Declaration of Independence reflects the universality
and rational foundation for individual rights. See Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Human Rights and State
Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries Been Significantly Redrawn?, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 33, 38 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008).
8
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culture, remain profoundly important and are often implicit in judicial
human rights analysis even though not acknowledged as a basis for
decision-making.13 In the secular United States legal culture, pragmatism
incorporates analysis of the reasonableness of law based on meaningful
consideration of the plaintiff’s claims within the contextual consequences
of expanding legal rights and restricting future governmental conduct.
This competing bipolar framework of values and the often-mediating role
of pragmatism will be reviewed in the civil and human rights cases
addressed herein.14 Justice is polysemous and quantum-like in its
contextual locus but remains a noble quest for victims of government
misconduct.
II. THE TRIUMPH OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY “FROM ABOVE”15
A. Core Qualified Immunity Principles
The regime of qualified immunity, potentially available to every
governmental employee sued individually for damages, was significantly
advanced by the Supreme Court in a decision resolving whether senior
aides and advisors to the President enjoyed derivative absolute
immunity.16 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court determined that
13
See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 81 (Alfred A. Knopf 2016) (providing a
detailed review of this subject).
14
It is noteworthy that one of the Supreme Court’s newest members, Justice Gorsuch, was
strongly influenced by his Oxford dissertation advisor, the natural law scholar John Finnis,
whose academic work includes significant analysis of Aquinas and natural law. See, e.g.,
JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 79, 184 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988); Neil Gorsuch: The Natural,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2017, at 21. Several members of the Supreme Court received a Roman
Catholic education, as did Justice Scalia whom Justice Gorsuch replaced, although any
natural law and ethics influence on their respective decision-making analysis in human and
civil rights cases is amorphic.
15
This Article does not focus on absolute immunity awarded to governmental officials
carrying out specific official duties. For legislatures engaged in legislative tasks, see Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378–79 (1951); prosecutors acting in an official prosecutorial
capacity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and judges engaged in judicial
duties, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359–60, 362–64 (1978). These decisions are
grounded on the paramount governmental interests inherent in the exercise of such duties.
See also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342–44 (2009) (providing further absolute
immunity analysis). The primary focus here is qualified immunity and its inherent analytical
biases favoring stingy treatment of substantive law supporting the plaintiff’s claims, often
coupled with generous treatment of the governmental actor’s presumed contextual
knowledge, although the plaintiff’s perspective is irrelevant.
16
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (asserting that presidential aides do
not qualify for absolute immunity when performing all of their duties). See also Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 passim (1982). At its zenith of power, governmental immunity
grounded on separation of powers protects the President from the burdens of litigation
regarding official conduct while in office. But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705–06 (1997)
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absolute immunity was contextually inappropriate under its “functional”
approach; instead, the Court concluded that qualified immunity was
applicable.17 The Court then determined that the subjective aspect of
qualified immunity, whereby immunity was not available if the official
took the action with the malicious intent to cause a deprivation of
constitutional or other rights, was incompatible with the principle that
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.18 Essentially, the Court
concluded that the previous balancing of values test set forth in Butz v.
Economou, with its focus on the subjective intent of the governmental actor,
was too costly:
Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials
to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their
governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action,
and deterrence of able people from public service. There
are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind.
Immunity generally is available only to officials
performing discretionary functions. In contrast with the
thought processes accompanying “ministerial” tasks, the
judgments surrounding discretionary action almost
inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s
experiences, values, and emotions. These variables
explain in part why questions of subjective intent so
rarely can be decided by summary judgment. 19
Consequently, the Court concluded that all government officials
performing discretionary duties will be shielded from liability unless they
violate “clearly established” rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.20 Qualified immunity shields government officials from
liability for civil damages when the official acts in a way that he

(concluding that it is not a violation of separation of powers to bring action against the
President while in office); Charlie Savage, Newly Disclosed Clinton-era Memo Says Presidents
Can Be Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2017, at A17; Adam Liptak, Trump’s Precedent for
Immunity Claim? Clinton v. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, at A10.
17
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811. Previously, the Court focused on a functional analysis of
government conduct and awarded absolute immunity for official capacity conduct
consistent with the official’s specific duties but not while the official was engaged in other
duties. Id. at 810–13.
18
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–19.
19
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978). Butz
reiterated that “[i]nsubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated” under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for many reasons, including failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). Id.
20
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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“reasonably believe[s] to be lawful.” 21 This focus, the Court concluded,
“should avoid excessive disruption of government.” 22 In principle,
“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.”23 This powerful defensive
shield provides “ample room for mistaken judgments” and protects “all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”24
The Court’s desired policy objectives of protecting all government
actors but the plainly incompetent and those who intentionally violate
civil rights, and also avoiding perceived disruption of government affairs
resulting from litigation, reflect the fundamental “justice from above”
principle contested herein. The Court’s recital of the paramount
governmental policy interests at stake in qualified immunity cases was
expansive, but analytically shallow and a theoretical “top down”
postulation:
These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being
sued will “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,
or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.”
In identifying qualified immunity as the best
attainable accommodation of competing values . . . we
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
“[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated.” 25
As a consequence of refocusing on the objective reasonableness of the
government actor’s conduct, contextual pro-government policy
considerations can become the exclusive judicially considered
perspective. The narrow focus of that lens functions like a legal Photoshop
that crops out the plaintiff’s perspective, which this Article seeks to
restore. Harlow was an express policy-based decision.26 Policy is not
immutable, but Harlow’s analysis has been interpreted as if chiseled into
the Supreme Court’s foundation.
21
22
23
24
25
26

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1997).
Id. at 653 n.5.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citations omitted).
See id. at 819 (explaining the role that public interest played in the Court’s ruling).
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Emphasizing the power of these governmental interests, the Supreme
Court has held that in order to spare the government actor from the
unnecessary burdens of litigation, the threshold question of qualified
immunity should be resolved at the earliest practical stage of litigation. 27
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once raised, the plaintiff
carries the burden of proof to defeat qualified immunity.28 Consequently,
if qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss the complaint, the
plaintiff must legally analyze the pleaded facts to establish that settled
legal principles demonstrate that:
(1) the defendant violated a
constitutional or statutory right; and (2) “the right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct” so that it would have
been “clear to a reasonable officer that her conduct was unlawful in the
situation.”29 A right is considered to be “clearly established” when
existing precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.”30 Previously, “clearly established” law was understood to
require only that the plaintiff “show either a reasonably analogous case
that has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a factual
circumstance similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so
obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as
a violation of the law.”31
Furthermore, since Saucier, qualified immunity protects government
officials even if the actor is mistaken as to what the law requires. 32 If the
mistake was reasonable, the government actor is immune, irrespective of
certitude that the actor’s conduct caused injury to the plaintiff. A
government actor’s mistake of law will not necessarily result in a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts explained, so long as the
mistake is “objectively reasonable.” 33 Because “reasonable men make
mistakes of law, too,” an officer’s reasonable mistake of law should not
automatically result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment because an
officer’s similar reasonable mistake of fact is permissible, and it would be
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. As a general matter, defendants carry the burden of proof
with regard to affirmative defenses raised under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), or otherwise.
29
See Butz, 438 U.S. at 507–08 (raising qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss); Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). A court may
dismiss the action based on analysis of either prong of this test. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. See
also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 84 (2018); Michael
Silverstein, Note, Rebalancing Harlow: A New Approach to Qualified Immunity in the Fourth
Amendment, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495, 518–28 (2017) (criticizing, like this Article, judicial
expansion of the qualified immunity doctrine).
30
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added).
31
Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 1997).
32
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
33
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536, 539 (2014).
27
28
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inconsistent with precedent and the text of the Fourth Amendment to hold
otherwise.34
As the White Court recently reiterated:
“[C]learly established law” should not be defined “at a
high level of generality.” As this Court explained decades
ago, the clearly established law must be “particularized”
to the facts of the case. Otherwise, “[p]laintiffs would be
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a
rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging
violation of extremely abstract rights.” 35
Rarely would a government defense attorney fail to accept this universal
invitation to attack the plaintiff’s damages claim as “abstract,” not clearly
established, or not “particularized” to the factual contextirrespective of
certain causation of injury to the plaintiff. 36 Qualified immunity can be
rotely analyzed by courts as a “rule” of law, elevated above policy,
notwithstanding the absence of the plaintiff’s perspective and the
empirically undeveloped governmental burdens of litigation.
Qualified immunity may be raised at any stage of the legal process,
and given its enshrined doctrinal power to prevent government officials
from having to endure the future burdens of litigation, an interlocutory
appeal from its denial may be taken, which shuts down the trial court
proceedings.37 Of course, the plaintiff must then suffer the financial and
case delay burdens of appellate proceedings, but those burdens are
invisible and not a doctrinal concern. 38 A district court’s decision to deny
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2001)).
36
A related but vacuous policy concern is to avoid creating disincentives for government
to take innovative actions in new legal contexts. See Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1, 13–14 (2009), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/theexample-of-america [https://perma.cc/22KF-AWNE].
37
See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
38
A case litigated by the author illustrates the powerful impact of qualified immunity on
the course of civil proceedings. In Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2014), the
plaintiff sued Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker in his individual capacity for damages as a
result of his failure to appoint her to a county clerk position because of, inter alia, his
interview on Fox News in which he disclosed personal financial information and expressly
referenced her former bankruptcy proceeding as the basis for his decision. The Constitution
protects specific privacy interests and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits irrational
discrimination. The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 525, expressly prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of a bankruptcy proceeding. After over three years of motions
and legal briefing, two trips to the Seventh Circuit, and an ongoing district court order
prohibiting the plaintiff from obtaining any discovery, the Seventh Circuit ordered the
privacy and equal protection claims dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
34
35
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qualified immunity is deemed a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
is immediately appealable unless material facts regarding its applicability
are genuinely disputed, a rare express exception to the non-appealability
of interlocutory orders.39 Why this exception? Because the Supreme
Court has concluded that qualified immunity serves an important
governmental function.40 Because the essence of qualified immunity is
immunity from suit, its core purpose is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.41
The foregoing Supreme Court decisions and embedded policy
sprouting from Harlow have significantly altered the analytical fulcrum
and balancing of interests to heavily plate the government’s defensive
armor with positive law principles.42 As these decisions and others
addressed below demonstrate, plaintiffs’ damages claims can be given
dismissive “airy-fairy” treatment. Qualified immunity entrenches the
legal status quo, which is also a desired outcome for judges favoring an
“originalist” or “conservative” approach to constitutional interpretation.
Analysis of the most recent Supreme Court civil rights decisions
addressing qualified immunity will further delineate these concerns.
B. The Supreme Court’s Application of Qualified Immunity Principles in
Recent Civil Rights Cases
Recent Supreme Court terms included several cases addressing when
law enforcement officers may be sued for a monetary remedy. In White v.
Pauly, the Supreme Court vacated the denial of qualified immunity in a
Fourth Amendment excessive force case because there was no clearly
settled principle relevant to the unique factual context to place the
constitutional claim beyond debate.43 Relying on analysis in Anderson,
which instructed that “clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to
the facts of the case,” the Court reiterated that a reasonable officer must
know that his conduct would violate a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right.44 This legal fiction presumes, of course, that the
officer had previously analyzed all contextually relevant cases
establishing rights beyond debate before deciding to act. Because the
39
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 307, 320 (1996) (holding that the agent was not a
candidate for qualified immunity and denying his appeal). See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
304, 316–17 (1995) (stating the three reasons why orders such as the one in question are not
appealable).
40
See White, 137 S. Ct. at 551–52 (explaining that qualified immunity is effectively lost if a
case is permitted to go to trial, which should not be).
41
See id.
42
See, e.g., infra Part II.B (discussing qualified immunity).
43
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam).
44
Id. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1997).
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Court created qualified immunity as a foundational rule of justice from
above, which “is important to ‘society as a whole,’” the officer in White,
who arrived late at an active police encounter and shot and killed an
armed house occupant without giving any warning, was immune. 45 Prior
settled Fourth Amendment law did not categorically prohibit the shooting
in this presumed novel factual context, and the perspective of the
deceased regarding his encounter with the officers was functionally
irrelevant.46 Nor was the enshrined inalienable natural law right to life
perspective relevant.47
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Supreme Court unanimously
struck down the Ninth Circuit’s pro-plaintiff “provocation rule.” 48 The
Mendez plaintiffs had been awarded almost four million dollars in
damages following a bench trial on the merits of their Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims because deputies “intentionally or recklessly
provoke[d] a violent confrontation [establishing] an independent Fourth
Amendment violation.”49 The two plaintiffs were living in a property
shack when they were shot by deputies who invaded—without a warrant
and without knocking—while searching for another person.50 Three
Fourth Amendment claims were filed: (1) warrantless entry; (2) knockand-announce violation; and (3) excessive force.51 The Ninth Circuit
awarded qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce claim but not
the warrantless entry claim.52 Although the Ninth Circuit also concluded
that the shooting was reasonable under Graham, nevertheless, it applied
the “provocation rule” and held the two deputies liable for the use of
excessive force because they had entered the shack without a warrant,
which was found to be unreasonable and the proximate cause of the
shooting.53
White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. See also City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
n.3 (2015).
46
See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (reasoning that no settled Fourth Amendment principle
mandates that an officer second-guess the previous steps already taken by fellow officers).
47
See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of Criminal Laws, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 747–48 (explaining that natural law theory requires punishing the
perpetrator regardless of whether the conduct was defined as illegal).
48
See County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (stating that the
provocation rule requires one to look at the subjective intent of the officers).
49
Id. at 1542.
50
Id. at 1544–45.
51
Id. at 1545.
52
Id. at 1549.
53
See id. at 1545 (proving unauthorized force requires: (1) the officer intentionally or
recklessly provoked a violent response; and (2) that the provocation is an independent
constitutional violation). Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1542 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989)). Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit found that proximate cause policy principles would
independently support liability, but that analysis was also reversed.
45
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However, the Supreme Court concluded that the “provocation rule”
altered the “settled and exclusive framework” used to determine whether
the force used in effecting a seizure conforms with the Fourth Amendment
because courts must balance an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the situational governmental interests and decide “whether the
force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable.’” 54 The ultimate
issue in an excessive force case remains “whether the totality of the
circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of [search or] seizure.” 55 The
Court held that the “provocation rule” was inconsistent with Graham and
other Fourth Amendment precedent because “[t]he rule’s fundamental
flaw is that it uses another constitutional violation to manufacture an
excessive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.” 56 The Court
also narrowed the scope of proximate cause analysis under Paroline,57
applicable in civil rights tort cases, by concluding that the Ninth Circuit
“conflated” it.58 Although not discussed, qualified immunity would have
foreclosed any award of damages in that case, even if the Fourth
Amendment was expanded to include the “provocation rule.” 59
At issue in Manuel v. City of Joliet, was whether to analyze a claim
arising from the plaintiff’s pretrial detention of forty-eight days under the
Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. 60 The prolonged
detention was a consequence of false police forensic data regarding pills
seized during the plaintiff’s traffic stop.61 The Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding a state judge’s finding of probable cause and the start of
legal proceedings, the claim could proceed under the Fourth Amendment
because the initial probable cause finding was based on fabricated
evidence.62 A Fourth Amendment claim focuses on the objective
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, whereas a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim (like an Eighth Amendment postconviction claim) incorporates a subjective state of mind component, such
as deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness, which the plaintiff
must prove.63 The Court did expressly comment on the “contours and
County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
55
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1546–47; Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
56
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1546 (emphasis added).
57
See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2014).
58
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549.
59
Id.
60
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 914 (2017).
61
Id. at 915.
62
See id. at 922 (remanding for the lower court to address the rules and elements of a
Fourth Amendment claim).
63
Compare Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 306–07 (1994), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 116–19 (1975) (addressing minimum objective standards and procedures for pretrial
54
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prerequisites of a § 1983 claim” with an implicit “from below” perspective
that rejected strict common-law restraints on the scope of civil rights
claims.64 However, the qualified immunity defense, premised on the
unsettled status of either claim, looms on remand. 65 On remand, the
Seventh Circuit held that the statute of limitations for the surviving Fourth
Amendment lack of probable cause claim began upon release from
detention and remanded the case to the district court where the qualified
immunity defense looms.66
Manuel illustrates how the defendant’s state of mind may be a
significant factor to be considered by plaintiff’s counsel in pleading
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983.67 In dissent, Justice Alito
addressed doctrinal concerns regarding total preclusion of a defendant’s
state of mind requirement in Fourth Amendment cases:
[W]hile subjective bad faith, i.e., malice, is the core
element of a malicious prosecution claim, it is firmly
established that the Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness is fundamentally objective. . . . These two
standards—one subjective and the other objective—
cannot co-exist. In some instances, importing a malice
requirement into the Fourth Amendment would leave

restraints on liberty), with Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (establishing the
deliberate indifference standard for assessing a defendant’s potentially culpable state of
mind). When a post-conviction claim is raised regarding the conditions of confinement, the
Eighth Amendment’s two-part test involving the objective seriousness of the conditions and
the subjective state of mind of the defendants are analyzed. Id. See also Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 (2015) (considering the requisite state of mind for an
excessive force case). The Fourteenth Amendment test may be objective or include a
subjective component depending on the nature of the specific claim. Id.
64
Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920.
65
For example, officers who knowingly or recklessly submit an affidavit to obtain a search
or seizure warrant that contains falsehoods may, nevertheless, be awarded qualified
immunity if the affidavit independently sets forth an objectively reasonable basis to
demonstrate probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854,
860 (7th Cir. 2012).
66
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018).
67
The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
However, neither a state nor a state actor sued in official capacity is a “person” suable under
§ 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62 (1989).
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culpable conduct unpunished. An officer could act
unreasonably, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment,
without even a hint of bad faith.68
The plaintiff’s state of mind or emotional injury generally remains
irrelevant to overcoming a qualified immunity defense. District of
Columbia v. Wesby69 specifically raised the issue of whether officers can
discredit a plaintiff’s asserted innocent state of mind and be awarded
qualified immunity for arresting “trespassers” (sixteen arrestees sued) at
a house party without a warrant because Fourth Amendment probable
cause precedent was not clearly established in this context. 70
Consequently, even arguable probable cause for an arrest warrants
summary judgment based on qualified immunity whenever an officer
could have suspected that an individual might be lying about his
identity.71 The doctrine of qualified immunity is now even further
unmoored from its original purpose of granting immunity only in qualified
circumstances so as to not undermine core remedial justice principles.
Another recent example of this unmooring was Kisela v. Hughes.72 The
Court decided to blanket a law enforcement officer in qualified immunity
when the officer shot the plaintiff four times without warning while she
was brandishing a kitchen knife at another woman.73 The Court stated
that although the officer was not in apparent danger, it was not clearly
established that shooting the plaintiff to protect another person would
violate the Fourth Amendment.74 However, in dissent, Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the majority “sidesteps” inquiring
into the reasonableness of the officer’s action, which reflects “a one-sided
approach to qualified immunity [which] transforms the doctrine into an
absolute shield . . . gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment.”75 The dissent would have denied qualified immunity
based on the officer’s unreasonable action in shooting a woman who

Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 925.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 593 (2018).
70
See id. at 585 (describing the issues the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
related to qualified immunity of the officers).
71
See id. at 592–93. See also Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 909 (7th Cir. 2018)
(stating that any reasonable subjective uncertainty about a person’s identity “points toward
qualified immunity”).
72
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).
73
Id. at 1151–52.
74
Id. at 1153. The Court continued to hold open the question of whether a Court of
Appeals’ internal precedents may constitute “clearly established law.” Id.
75
Id. at 1158, 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
68
69
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posed no objective threat to him or others, was not suspected of a crime,
and who remained calm during the encounter.76
C. Plenary Qualified Immunity Policy Analysis Should Both Minimize the
“Clearly Established” Law Mandate and Incorporate Judicial Consideration
of the Plaintiff’s Injury and Right to a Remedy
Section 1983 of the United States Code is the primary remedial vehicle
for asserting tort liability for damages against government actors under
the Constitution and federal statutory provisions in the foregoing civil
rights cases.77 Once liability for damages is legally established, proximate
cause tort analysis applies and includes consideration of several policy
factors, some favoring an award of damages and justice for the victim even
in the absence of certitude regarding the extent of resultant injuries.78
Although proximate cause analysis only enters the legal process after
judicial denial of qualified immunity and other defenses, nevertheless, the
interests of the plaintiff reappear in the legal process. 79 A successful
assertion of qualified immunity functions like a lacuna that forecloses
analysis of the plaintiff’s specific legal interests and favorable policy
factors inherent in proximate cause analysis and the ultimate liability
question. Foreclosing a jury’s liability determination authority also
precludes the award of remedial relief, including punitive damages,
which enforce strong public policy supporting punishment and
deterrence of future violation of rights. 80
Fearing qualified immunity may preclude any judicial analysis that
incorporates their clients’ perspective “from below,” civil rights attorneys
are often loathe to file cases seeking to expand substantive legal principles
Id. at 1157 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Interestingly, when § 1983 was passed by Congress in 1871 no
companion statutory qualified immunity limitation was enacted. Yet, the Supreme Court
sweeps the common law then in existence to determine who may be entitled to qualified
immunity. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012) (reasoning that the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 did not abrogate common-law immunity). See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
345–46 (1983); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341, U.S. 367, 376 (1951). Further, in Imbler v. Pachtman,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on cases decided after 1871, in order to bestow broad
immunity upon public prosecutors when sued for common-law torts. Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 419–31 (1976).
78
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013). See also Gayton
v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 624 (7th Cir. 2010). Causation is generally a jury issue and certitude
of injury is not required. Id.
79
See Karen Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and What is
Not, TOURO L. REV. 501, 503 (2008) (explaining the exception to the clearly established right
standard when an official relies on the legal advice of counsel).
80
See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, ALA. L.
REV., 1143, 1146–47 (1989) (recognizing deterrence as a goal of punitive damages).
76
77

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/3

Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"

2018]

Immunity “From Below”

61

and damages remedies.81 The supporting legal theory may be deemed
novel or relevant precedents may not be factually analogous, inviting
defendants to assert qualified immunity and escape any accountability. 82
The phalanx of additional affirmative defenses available, though not
unique to civil rights cases, also inhibits prosecution of civil rights cases
because of the extraordinary time and expenses inherently involved in
playing defense against the myriad of routine motions to dismiss and
affirmative defenses to be encountered.83 This legal culture contributes to
the stagnation of legal development in response to new societal, political,
and economic developments. Qualified immunity is “anti-textual” and
exclusively judge-made law based on policy.84 Consequently, policy
considerations “from below” should be embedded in the analysis. They
are absent. From a plaintiff’s perspective, why should the court consider
whether the underlying law was previously “clearly established” if a
violation thereof and consequential damages can be proven, even if the
claim is unprecedented?85 Why should the defendant’s state of mind often
gain the paramount legal focus in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment cases, while the victim’s subjective state of suffering loses
consideration in determining whether a case should proceed? 86
Furthermore, why must qualified immunity be expanded to also shield
certain private actors in symbiotic relationships with the government? 87
These questions express the limited judicial policy consciousness inherent
in qualified immunity contexts, which systemically tilts the balance of
competing factors in favor of governmental interests.88 Rote incantation
81
See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1623–24 (2011) (associating qualified
immunity claims and nominal damages).
82
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 (1997).
83
These defenses only multiply if the plaintiff raises a state law tort or related claim
because each state has its own regime of governmental immunity premised on the need for
government to function effectively without fear of litigation resulting from discretionary
decision-making. Stingy judicial interpretations of the “ministerial duty” exception to
immunity further expands the scope of discretionary decision-making immunity. See David
T. Prosser, Jr., Reining in Governmental Immunity, THE VERDICT, Fall 2016, at 39, for a frank
acknowledgment of this point by a former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice.
84
McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 2000).
85
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735–36 (2011).
86
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (noting that having the proper state of
mind is required to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
87
See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1663–64 (2012) (setting forth a historical inquiry as
to whether the private actor may have enjoyed common-law immunity in 1871 when § 1983
was enacted). See also Melchert v. Pro Elec. Contractors, 892 N.W.2d 710, 725 (Wis. 2017)
(holding that a private contractor was entitled to governmental immunity under state law
for property damages caused while carrying out government contractual specifications).
88
Qualified immunity does not apply in cases seeking only declaratory or injunctive
relief; however, courts have never explained why the paramount goal of sparing the
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of nineteenth century common law immunity policy principles minimizes
consciousness of the plaintiff’s perspective.89
Qualified immunity policy factors also ignore the legal reality that
damages remedies against government officials acting within the scope of
their employment duties are generally indemnified by the employing
governmental entity, which is consistent with the remedial purpose of
civil rights laws that victims actually receive justice.90 It has been wellsettled since Bell v. Hood that “[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and
a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasions,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.”91 Socialized compensation can be viewed as a measure of justice
“from below.”92
It is also noteworthy that Justice Sotomayor has expressly criticized
the willingness of the Supreme Court to accept cases in which qualified
immunity has been denied, while rarely accepting cases challenging the
grant of qualified immunity:
It also continues a disturbing trend regarding the use of
this Court’s resources. We have not hesitated to
summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers
the protection of qualified immunity in cases involving
the use of force. . . . But we rarely intervene where courts
wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity
in these same cases. The erroneous grant of summary
judgment in qualified immunity cases imposes no less
harm on “society as a whole,” . . . than does the erroneous
denial of summary judgment in such cases. We took one
step toward addressing this asymmetry in Tolan. . . . We
take one step back today.93

government from the burdens of litigation should not apply in all litigation. Pfander, supra
note 81, at 1633–34. Establishing the right to a damages remedy generally requires the same
litigation burdens as establishing liability for purposes of declaratory or injunctive relief. Id.
89
See Pfander, supra note 81, at 1638 (noting that government liability has roots in the
nineteenth century).
90
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-4-1 (Westlaw through 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825
(Westlaw through 2018) (providing examples of state indemnification statutes).
91
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 774 (1946).
92
See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856, 1866 (2017) (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
438 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)) (recognizing the existence of social costs in government
accountability cases). To the contrary, the plurality opinion in Abbasi concluded that
indemnification is one of many “substantial costs” the government must bear in litigating
damages claims.
93
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83 (2017) (citations omitted).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/3

Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"

2018]

Immunity “From Below”

63

In Tolan, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s summary
judgment grant of qualified immunity because of the lower court’s
egregious dismissive treatment of the plaintiff’s opposing evidence, and
the Court implicitly acknowledged the asymmetric treatment of plaintiffs
and defendants in qualified immunity summary judgment analysis.94 But
that was a very rare case, indeed.
Largely ignored in recent Supreme Court decisions is the Pearson
Court’s counter-balancing directive “to hold public officials accountable
when they exercise power irresponsibly.”95 Restoring legal consciousness
of this directive is the pervasive theme of this Article.96 However,
governmental immunity remains the uber-powerful counter-force. In
moral language, qualified immunity represents the triumph of amoral
governmental power over human values. This fulsome judicial minting
of qualified immunity and related positivist doctrines will now be
analyzed in recent human rights cases to assess even broader doctrinal
expansion of the governmental impunity template to international
conduct.97
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SOVEREIGN AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND
RELATED POLICY-BASED DEFENSES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CASES
This Article’s focus now expansively shifts to consider legal principles
and embedded policy pronouncements in Supreme Court and selected
federal court decisions awarding governmental immunity or otherwise
curtailing remedies for international human rights abuses.98 Whether new
Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (per curiam).
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815.
96
To align with “bottom-up” thinking, immunity analysis should proceed from “the
basement of evidence and experience” wherein each plaintiff is uniquely legally situated to
JOHN
inform “higher” general legal principles favoring governmental power.
POLKINGHORNE, FAITH, SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING 203 (Yale Univ. Press 2000).
97
See infra Part III. With respect to the immunity focus of this Article, a bright line does
not separate civil rights and human rights cases. Often, cases raise both sets of claims. For
example, see Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008), and Medellin v. Texas
(Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 759–60 (2008), wherein claims were raised under both the U.S.
Constitution and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36.1(b), and the
subsequent series of related challenges by foreign nationals who claimed they were detained
without proper timely notice to respective consular officials, including Mordi v. Zeigler, 770
F.3d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 2014), in which the specific Vienna Convention claim was dismissed
on qualified immunity grounds.
98
See infra Part III.A. The primary purpose of Part III is to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court’s application of the full panoply of immunity doctrines will be even more pronounced
in cases involving asserted national security interests or military conduct, whether within or
outside the United States. Cases seeking to impose governmental and individual liability for
international human rights violations are often dismissed on other powerful doctrinal
94
95
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norms of liability are set forth in Congressional enactments that are
relevant or responsive to recent geopolitical events also will be addressed
within this immunity analysis.99
A. International Human Rights Law Openings to Justice “From Below”?
Multitudes of human rights cases have been filed in federal courts in
recent years, raising a panorama of novel international and domestic legal
claims. As an initial matter, it must be noted that in a trio of cases the
Supreme Court has checked the President’s national security power
asserted in the wake of September 11. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus challenges to
the legality of detaining foreign nationals at Guantánamo Bay. 100 In Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the President cannot hold U.S.
citizens as “enemy combatant[s]” indefinitely without affording them a
meaningful opportunity to defend themselves, which comports with basic
due process principles.101 Further, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme
Court restricted the President’s power to create special military
commissions for enemy detainees at Guantánamo and held that the
Geneva Conventions apply to al-Qaeda detainees (and presumably other
Some legal
alleged foreign terrorist organization members).102
commentators were strident in their support of executive branch
authoritarianism and impunity from legal challenge in response to Hamdi
and in anticipation of the Court’s ruling in Hamdan.103

grounds including state secrets, political question, or other policy grounds not addressed
herein.
99
See infra Part III.B. Analysis on this point is limited to a summary of the relationship
between international human rights events and immunity principles in prominent selected
cases, rather than an exhaustive analysis of all relevant cases.
100
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) (reasoning that citizenship is not a factor to
determine whether detainees at Guantánamo Bay can invoke federal court).
101
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
famously stated in her plurality opinion: “a state of war is not a blank check for the President
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Id. at 536.
102
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–35 (2006). See also David Scheffer, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: The Supreme Court Affirms International Law, JURIST (June 30, 2006),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2006/06/hamdan-v-rumsfeld-supreme-court.php
[https://perma.cc/8WC8-HBHL] (recognizing that international law is embedded in U.S.
law). The Court’s detailed analysis of the relevant controlling provision of the Geneva
Convention of 1949 may be a significant judicial milestone regarding the incorporation of
international law.
103
See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, Rule of Law: Judicial Overreach, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004, at
A24; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Geneva Convention and POWs, WASH. TIMES (Nov.
16, 2004), http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041115091908-8539-r [https://perma.cc/2TJU-3SVJ].
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In a fourth pertinent decision, Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court
struck down parts of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and held that
foreign detainees at Guantánamo have a right to judicial review under a
three-part balancing of interests test. 104 The Court reasoned: “[t]o hold
that the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or
off at will . . . [would] lead[] to a regime in which Congress and the
President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”105 Thus, government and
military conduct that allegedly violates human rights under the
Constitution is not inherently absolutely immune from legal challenge. 106
While damages were not at issue before the Supreme Court in these cases,
retired Justice John Paul Stevens, who authored the majority opinion in
Hamdan, has proposed that “certain” Guantánamo Bay detainees should
receive reparations analogous to those received by Japanese-Americans
detained during World War II.107
Former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, who criticized the
Hamdan ruling, pragmatically argued for greater executive branch
authority to confront terrorist threats, although within the pragmatic
104
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008) (prohibiting government officials
from manipulating the standards used to restrain their powers). In this habeas corpus
proceeding, the Court articulated a balancing test regarding application of the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 766. Lakhdar Boumediene and fellow
prisoner Mustafa Ait Idir published an account of their experiences in Guantánamo entitled
WITNESSES OF THE UNSEEN: SEVEN YEARS IN GUANTÁNAMO (Redwood Press 2017). See also
Sabrina Toppa, I Want Americans to Know That Guantánamo Happened Not to Monsters, but to
Men, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/media/2017/05/
lakhdar-boumediene-guantanamo-book-witnesses-of-the-unseen/
[https://perma.cc/
BB93-BHW2] (describing Bourmediene’s treatment in Guantánamo Bay). See also Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 10 U.S.C. § 94849 (2006).
105
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
106
One commentator expressly opined that Boumediene was an express rejection of Carl
Schmitt’s positivist legal philosophy. See Scott Horton, A Setback for the State of Exception,
HARPER’S MAG. (June 13, 2008), https://harpers.org/blog/2008/06/a-setback-for-the-stateof-exception/ [perma.cc/4JND-A7JN] (comparing the liberties George W. Bush attempted
to take with checks and balances during war time, which the Court struck down, to Schmitt’s
legal thinking). See infra note 124 (discussing Carl Schmitt further).
107
See Mark Berman, John Paul Stevens Says Some Guantanamo Detainees Should Be Given
Reparations, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/05/05/john-paul-stevens-says-some-guantanamo-bay-detainees-shouldbe-given-reparations/ [https://perma.cc/5MFU-C6LG]. See also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 50a U.S.C. § 1989b (1988); Irvin Molotsky, Senate Votes to
TIMES
(Apr.
21,
1988),
Compensate
Japanese-Americans
Internees,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/21/us/senate-votes-to-compensate-japaneseamerican-internees.html [https://perma.cc/4Q5J-85QU]. Japanese-Americans detained
during World War II waited 46 years before receiving reparations.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 3

66

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

context of counter-weighing competing individual and moral interests. 108
District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, however, has specifically critiqued “the
shallowness of the judicial response to executive excesses committed in
the name of national security.”109 This stark conclusion aptly summarizes
Owen Fiss’s circumspect and somewhat gloomy survey of related postSeptember 11 constitutional developments that Judge Rakoff reviewed.110
B. Recent Human Rights Decisions and the Future Immunity Landscape
Individual government actors are often named defendants in human
rights cases, while other cases focus on the conduct of corporations or
private entities acting jointly with, or separate from, government actors.
Sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and the pastiche of other gateclosing doctrines are thus raised in more novel and expansive contexts. 111
How courts have analyzed immunity and related defenses, with or
without judicial consciousness of the justice “from below” counter-point,
is the focus of the following analysis. Recall, however, that rote recital of
an immunity defense may require a court to dip but one toe in the judicial
decision-making pool.112
1.

The Triumph of National Security Interests over Human Rights
Remains Intact

The doctrines of immunity and separation of powers triumphed in the
recent Supreme Court decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which consolidated
three cases involving six non-citizen Muslim men arrested and detained
108
See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (claiming that
there should be modification to constitutional rights in times of crisis like war). See also Emily
Bazelon, Maximum Security, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Sept. 10, 2006, at 29.
109
Jed S. Rakoff, ‘Terror’ and Everybody’s Rights, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/09/29/terror-and-everybodys-rights/
[https://perma.cc/XC7D-BLSZ].
110
OWEN FISS, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF TERROR 164–67
(2015). The preceding quartet of Supreme Court cases are given extensive analysis therein.
111
Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290–94 (2017). For example, in Lewis, a Mohegan tribal
member defendant who was sued in his individual capacity sought to assert tribal sovereign
immunity. The Supreme Court reiterated that in a civil rights suit against a state officer in
his individual capacity, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25 (1991) (directing courts to focus on who the real defendant in interest is in determining
whether sovereign immunity bars the case). An official capacity suit for damages against a
state official, however, implicates the Eleventh Amendment, which immunizes state
sovereignty from damages suits in federal court, subject to limited exceptions. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (demonstrating that an official capacity suit is a suit
against an entity, rather than an individual).
112
See supra Parts II.A, II.C (analyzing significant civil rights cases applying core qualified
immunity principles).
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in solitary confinement in the heart of Brooklyn for months following the
terrorist attacks of September 11.113 These men alleged that they were
tortured, subjected to multiple physical assaults and other abuses, and
endured inhumane detention conditions. They brought multiple Bivens
damages claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and a
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for violation of their equal
protection rights.114 The Court’s plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, rejected the advocated expansion of Bivens because it would
contextually violate “separation-of-powers principles for a court . . . to
create and enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials
in order to remedy a constitutional violation.”115 Claims that challenge
national security or immigration policy or practices are particularly
improper for courts because interpretation interferes with presidential or
congressional powers and expertise. 116 Courts must also defer to the
governmental costs of allowing such claims to be litigated: “[c]laims
against federal officials often create substantial costs, in the form of
defense and indemnification.”117 The counter-balancing cost of denying

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (per curiam). Abbasi drew swift media attention.
See, e.g., Editorial, The Justices Act Like Grown-Ups, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2017, at A16; Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Says Bush Officials Cannot Be Sued for Post-9/11 Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2017, at A15; Richard Wolf, Bush Officials Aren’t Liable for 9/11 Detentions, USA TODAY,
June 20, 2017, at 8A.
114
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Fed. Bureau Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In
Bivens, the Court authorized judicial creation of a constitutional claim for damages against a
federal officer or employee, albeit in specific, limited contexts. Bivens claims have been
extended to encompass other claims. See, e.g., Davis v. Passmon, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(extending Bivens to cover due process employment claims); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980) (allowing Bivens to cover Eighth Amendment inmate claims). But see, e.g., United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (refusing to allow Bivens to cover personal injury claims
by military personnel). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2010) (“If two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance
of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”).
115
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch did not participate
in the case.
116
Governmental interest in preserving national security remains “an urgent objective of
the highest order.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
117
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
113
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justice to the victims of these detailed human rights stains was only briefly
mentioned.118
Further, the Court granted qualified immunity on the asserted
conspiracy claims for two reasons. First, there was no clearly established
law on whether the same executive branch employees or agents are distinct
enough to conspire within the meaning of § 1985(3).119 Second, open
communication among federal officials should be encouraged regarding
policy decision-making, particularly in an asserted national security
context.120 Unaddressed in this intellectual arabesque was why such
communication should be legally encouraged when the net result was
torture. One answer may be the continuing vitality of autoritas, non veritas,
facit legem, which stands for the idea that positivist exercises of power, not
virtue, make the law and immunize the actors.121
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg vehemently dissented, and set forth a
balanced and reflective assessment of the competing interests at stake. 122
According to the dissent, “History tells us of far too many instances where
the Executive or Legislative Branch took actions during time of war that,
on later examination, turned out unnecessarily and unreasonably to have
deprived American citizens of basic constitutional rights.” 123 The policy
analysis in Abbasi resonates with the positivist “state of exception” legal

118
Governmental assertion of “special factors,” analyzed in Bivens, will likely preclude
creating a claim for damages directly under the Constitution and require express
Congressional authorization. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 44 (1980). See also FISS, supra
note 110, at 184–92 (noting “special factors” favoring creating a claim for damages have been
tightly circumscribed in Supreme Court Bivens-related decisions).
119
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1868–69.
120
Id. at 1868.
121
A stark comparator is the Chinese legal system, which has made significant progress
expanding the availability of remedies in certain types of legal proceedings against the
government while maintaining absolute impunity from challenges to state authority in
military or political matters. See See You in Court, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2017, at 41.
122
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1874–75 (2017) (Breyer, J. dissenting). Justice Breyer is
receptive to the limited import, or “cross-referencing,” of international legal principles and
potentially binding international law in federal court statutory decisions. See STEPHEN G.
BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 245
(Alfred A. Knopf 2015). Justice Breyer asserted that “cross-referencing will speed the
development of ‘clusters’ or ‘pockets’ of legally like-minded nations whose judges learn
things from one another . . . .” Id. Justice Gorsuch, appearing with Justice Breyer at Harvard
University, also embraced this perspective in his first public remarks since joining the
Supreme Court and noted similarities between United States and English judicial
philosophy: “The similarities are profound . . . great respect for certain human rights. We
believe in certain forms of limited government, separation of powers.” See Adam Liptak,
Gorsuch Rejects Doubts Over ‘Rule of Law Today,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2017, at A17 (emphasis
added).
123
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1884.
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philosophy of Carl Schmitt.124 Even rote invocation of national security
interests by the government, whether evidence-based or an appeal to fear
and prejudice, dramatically shifts the judicial balance of interests and
equities to enhance the asserted government interests.125
Alleged national security concerns, contested as fueled solely by
discrimination, also permeated the broader context of two Fourth Circuit
and Ninth Circuit challenges consolidated in Trump v. International Refugee
Assistance Project.126 In Trump, the Supreme Court partially vacated
injunctions and ordered restricted enforcement of an Executive Order
which, inter alia, suspended entry into the United States of individuals
from six predominantly Muslim countries for ninety days.127 The
Supreme Court refused to stay or vacate a Hawaii District Court order
interpreting Trump to authorize grandparents and other relatives of
American residents to enter the country while the plenary legal
proceedings progressed.128 In September 2017, the Ninth Circuit held that

Throughout his dozens of published books and articles supporting the Third Reich, Carl
Schmitt grounded his fealty to Hitler and executive power on the positivist principle that
authority makes law, not virtue. See Vagts, supra note 7, at 87. Even today Schmitt has both
influence and credibility. See, e.g., Paul Gottfried, The Concept of Carl Schmitt, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/theconcept-of-carl-schmitt/ [https://perma.cc/G5HY-BLXN].
125
Indeed, this positivist perspective is expansive in conservative legal thinking, which
even analyzes human rights law as a “dangerous game” when state sovereignty is
challenged by international conduct seeking to halt human rights abuses. See Ingrid Wuerth,
Lecture, International Law and Peace Among Nations, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. (2017), https://lawmedia.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/e5e7f191068c4795bb51130415c5eb7e1d
[https://perma.cc/UL5S-GC7T].
126
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam).
The Court also paid homage to Justice Scalia’s prior statement that the balance of equities
must also encompass “the interests of the public at large.” Id. (citing Barnes v. E-Sys, Inc.
Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers)). At
its irrational extreme and without principled judicial braking, discriminatory fears of “the
other,” including foreign national children already in the U.S., leads down a legal path
toward “Exxilon justice.” See Doctor Who: Death to the Daleks (BBC television broadcast Feb.
23, 1974). The evidentiary metrics used for measuring the public interest remain amorphic
but may elevate political fear-mongering and prejudice over the perspectives of minority
communities.
127
See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (listing the countries
relevant to the travel ban as Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).
128
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34 (July 19, 2017) (denying motion for clarification
order). See also Adam Liptak, Trump Refugee Restrictions Allowed for Now; Ban on Grandparents
Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2017, at A16 (noting that while legal challenges to the travel
ban proceeded, grandparents and other relatives of American citizens would be exempt from
the travel ban); Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Allows More Extended-Family Exemptions
to Travel Ban, ABA J. (July 19, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
supreme_court_allows_grandparent_exemption_to_travel_ban [https://perma.cc/4GUDSDH3]. Justice Ginsburg frankly stated that the President’s policy was “too restrictive” to be
124
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grandparents, grandchildren, brothers- and sisters-in-law, uncles, aunts,
nieces, nephews, cousins, and refugees working with a resettlement
agency satisfy the “bona fide relationship” requirement imposed by the
executive order.129 Subsequently, Justice Kennedy issued a temporary
order allowing exclusion of most refugees,130 and the Supreme Court
issued an order in both pending cases requiring briefing on whether a
Presidential Proclamation (“Travel Ban 3.0”), further amending and
expanding the two prior travel bans, rendered the cases moot. 131
The continuing vitality of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and
its progeny as a brake on Presidential power to make law remains
uncertain in this context.132 Dozens of federal court lawsuits challenging
the President’s respective immigration and refugee Executive Orders and
Proclamations have been filed.133 In 2018, the Supreme Court issued a
decision upholding the validity of the President’s Orders and
Proclamations in Trump v. Hawaii.134 In a 5-4 decision, the majority
concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to prevent
the entry of individuals from six majority-Muslim nations because the
enforceable, given the family interests at stake. Adam Liptak, On Justice Ginsburg’s Summer
Docket: Blunt Talk on Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2017, at A13.
129
Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir. 2017). See also Miriam Jordan, Court Ruling
Opens Door Once Closed To Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A9.
130
See Adam Liptak, Justices Halt Move to Lift Parts of Ban On Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2017, at A19; Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Allows Broad Enforcement of Travel Ban—At Least
for a Day, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-dept-again-asks-supreme-court-to-allow-broad-enforcement-of-travel-ban
/2017/09/11/6c3853ae-970b-11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.92165c8ddb16
[https://perma.cc/LFS4-9AQR ].
131
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 50 (Sept. 25, 2017); Robert
Barnes, Administration Says Supreme Court Should Stop Review of Past Travel Bans, WASH. POST
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/administrationsays-supreme-court-should-stop-review-of-past-travel-bans/2017/10/05/f5d07c68-a9e411e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.d4a9039fbba7
[https://perma.cc/Y6Z8FXLB] (mentioning that courts have asked for new briefing regarding whether the issue is
moot due to Trump’s replacement of the travel ban); Michael D. Shear et al., Justices Cancel
Hearing on Travel Ban as Questions Linger on New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2017, at A12
(discussing the fact that courts have been reluctant to hear issues relating to the travel ban
since Trump replaced the previous travel ban); Michael D. Shear, Trump Imposes New Travel
Ban on 7 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2017, at A1 (noting the new travel ban rendered the
previous orders, and related issues, moot); Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, Ban on Travel Will
Be Replaced With New Schedule of Targeted Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2017, at A11.
132
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 592 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
133
See Civil Rights Challenges to Trump Refugee/Visa Order, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE (July
21,
2018),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44
[https://perma.cc/5Q3T-M4KX]. See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008); infra
Section III.B.2.
134
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).
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only prerequisite for such action is that the President finds that “entry of
the covered aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the national
interest [of the United States].”135
2.

Does the U.S. Constitution Apply to a Cross-Border Shooting or Does
Impunity Reign?

In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
tragic cross-border shooting and killing by a border patrol agent of a
fifteen-year-old Mexican national playing with friends in a cement culvert
separating Ciudad Juárez from El Paso.136 The Court had agreed to review
three questions: (1) whether the child’s parents may assert any Bivensbased claim for damages against the agent; (2) whether the shooting
violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) whether qualified immunity
mandates dismissal of the parents’ Fifth Amendment due process claim. 137
The Court remanded the Bivens claim in light of its preceding Abbasi
decision and also the Fourth Amendment question, which “is sensitive
and may have consequences that are far reaching.”138 With respect to the
Fifth Amendment claim, the Court held that the en banc Fifth Circuit had
erred in granting the border agent qualified immunity premised on the
alien status of the child who had no significant voluntary connections to
the United States.139 The Court noted “however, that Hernández’s
nationality and the extent of his ties to the United States were unknown to
Mesa at the time of the shooting.”140 After reciting relevant qualified
immunity principles, including analysis of “the facts that were knowable
to the defendant officers,” the Court concluded that the lower court erred

Id.
See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017) (per curiam) (recounting the death
of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca). The opinion recites the complex procedural history
regarding the underlying motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Id. at 2005–06.
137
Id. at 2004–05.
138
Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. This language implicitly reflects a pragmatic approach to
the competing positive law and natural law interests at stake. How this is contextually
resolved remains for future judicial resolution. Justice Thomas dissented on this point,
however, and simply concluded that Bivens cannot be extended beyond its original context.
Id. at 2008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139
Id. at 2007. See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). The Court in
Boumediene reasoned: “Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are
not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the
Constitution.’” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
140
Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. This statement is an express acknowledgement of the
agent’s perspective “from above,” even if its ultimate weight in the case’s outcome on
remand remains to be measured. The child’s perspective, however, has yet to enter judicial
consciousness.
135
136
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in granting the motion to dismiss because of qualified immunity, but the
issue could be raised again on remand.141
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented in part and concluded that the
Fourth Amendment claim, remanded for further analysis, should go
forward.142 The dissent set forth six sets of legal and policy principles that
legally cemented the border culvert between the United States and Mexico
“as having sufficient involvement with, and connection to, the United
States to subject the culvert to Fourth Amendment protections.” 143 In their
view, the Fourth Amendment issue was, therefore, proper for resolution
on the merits, although they agreed with the remand of the Bivens and
Fifth Amendment qualified immunity questions for further pre-trial
analysis.144 On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that extending Bivens in the
case would be improper because doing so would “interfere with the
political branches’ oversight of national security and foreign affairs,” and
because it “would create a remedy with uncertain limits.”145
However, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
U.S. border patrol agent was not entitled to qualified immunity when he
shot across the border and killed a teenage Mexican citizen without any
legal justifications, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 146 The Ninth
Circuit also allowed the extension of Bivens because there was no other
adequate remedy available, it was not clear that Congress deliberately
chose to preclude a remedy, and no policy factors precluded such a
remedy.147 The judicial treatment Rodriguez receives going forward may
be of great significance.
3.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) broadly shields
foreign states from suits in U.S. courts with very limited exceptions. 148
Id. (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam)).
Id. at 2008. The dissent cited to Wood v. Moss for the prior extension of Bivens to Fourth
Amendment claims. Id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056,
2065 (2014)).
143
Id. at 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144
Id at 2007.
145
Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018). See also Adam Liptak, Two U.S.
Agents Fired into Mexico Killing Teenagers. Only One Faces a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/agents-border-killingssupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5BKA-Q7DC] (noting that the Supreme Court has
been hesitant to extend Bivens).
146
See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 731, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that the teen killed
had a “Fourth Amendment right to be free from the objectively unreasonable use of deadly
force by an American agent acting on American soil”).
147
See id. at 748.
148
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
141
142
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Foreign sovereign immunity is a powerful jurisdictional bar, as was
reiterated in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.149 At issue therein was
whether the “expropriation exception” to immunity was applicable when
private property rights are taken in violation of international law. 150
Minimizing its review of the disputed factual background arising from
nationalized oil drilling rights in Venezuela, the Supreme Court focused
instead on sovereign immunity’s power to mandate early dismissal of
claims.151 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer’s opinion
significantly increased the pleading burden in FSIA cases by requiring the
plaintiff to establish a sovereign immunity exception with certainty.152 The
Court’s holding built upon threshold jurisdictional principles set forth in
Verlinden, further enshrined governmental immunity’s outcomedeterminative power at the very onset of legal proceedings, and advanced
Verlinden’s immunity policy analysis, which supports sparing the
government from the significant burdens of defending litigation. 153 The
United States, despite its adversarial diplomatic posture toward
Venezuela, filed an amicus brief in support of Venezuela, arguing in favor
of the strong presumption of governmental immunity, buttressed by
The Supreme Court’s powerfully reiterated
comity principles.154
impunity doctrine resonates with positive law theory and expressly
Bolivarian Republic Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312,
1322–23 (2017).
150
Id. at 1314–16 (“The expropriation exception applies to ‘any case . . . in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property . . . is owned
or generated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state . . . engaged in a commercial
activity in the United States.’”).
151
See id. at 1321 (stating that sovereign immunity typically shields sovereigns from suits).
Comity principles are often factored into the sovereign immunity analysis. See, e.g., Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895) (articulating comity as “the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”). Comity analysis has
blossomed in international human rights cases as another gate-closing doctrine that further
supports governmental impunity. See, e.g., Harlan S. Abrams & Brian E. Mattis, The Duty to
Decide vs. the Daedalian Doctrine of Abstention, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 12.
152
Bolivarian Republic Venez., 137 S. Ct. at 1316. But see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)
(holding that federal courts have jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution that are
not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”). Bell no longer rings like a clarion call to liberally
construe the plaintiff’s claims in civil and human rights cases.
153
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1983) (addressing the
concerns that foreign relations in the United States have regarding federal questions). See
also Bolivarian Republic Venez., 137 S. Ct. at 1318–19 (discussing the FSIA’s exceptions to
foreign immunity).
154
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20,
Bolivarian Republic Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017)
(No. 15-423), 2016 WL 4524346, at *1. When it comes to shared sovereign immunity interests,
hostile governments can jointly act like a band of brothers.
149
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forecloses a plaintiff’s ability to overcome jurisdictional barriers under
FSIA (or otherwise) by emphasizing the plaintiff’s injuries or, as disdained
by the Court, “through artful pleading.”155 Simply put: pleader beware!156
However, the Supreme Court earlier held in Samantar that FSIA
immunity does not extend to foreign officials. 157 Therefore, the door has
been left slightly ajar for torture victims to recover damages directly from
their foreign torturers, assuming that they have reachable assets. 158 On
remand in Samantar, the district court denied the individual defendants’
sovereign immunity motion to dismiss, and later entered a $21 million
damages judgment against a Somali government actor found liable for
torture dating back to the 1980s.159 Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of individual immunity. 160
Also, plaintiffs have been successful in overcoming FSIA
governmental immunity when, for strategic or political reasons, the
foreign state decides not to participate in the case. In Leibovitch, for
example, a default judgment of $67 million was entered regarding a 2003
highway terrorist attack by members of Palestine Islamic Jihad, funded in
part by Iran.161 However, efforts to collect Iranian assets have been
judicially frustrated, and the estate of a seven-year-old Israeli girl, her
permanently disabled three-year-old sister (an American citizen), and
surviving family members continues its seemingly quixotic search for
justice.162 In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit reviewed
the earlier District of Columbia District Court $71.5 million default
judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the state sponsor of
terrorism exception to FSIA immunity because Iran provided material
support to Hamas suicide bombers who grievously injured eight U.S.
155
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015). See supra note 7 and
accompanying text (noting how immunity doctrine resonates with positive law theory).
156
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (commanding lower courts to review more
aggressively plaintiff’s jurisdictional pleadings in analyzing motions to dismiss under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
157
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010). Of course, officials who allegedly
engaged in torture or other human rights violations may raise a panoply of other defenses
during the course of legal proceedings. Id at 324–25.
158
Id.
159
See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2011 WL 7445583, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011)
(denying motion); Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2012 WL 3730617, at *16 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 28, 2012) (entering judgment).
160
Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014).
Separately, a federal bankruptcy court held that the judgment against the defendant was
non-dischargeable because the asserted injuries were caused by willful and malicious
conduct. Yousuf v. Samantar, 537 B.R. 250, 256 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015).
161
Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 852 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2017).
162
See id. But see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (granting summary
judgement for plaintiffs).
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citizens in Jerusalem.163 Over a decade of fruitless post-judgment legal
proceedings followed in multiple jurisdictions to attach and execute on
Iranian assets, including the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that ancient
Persian art and artifacts located in four Chicago collections were beyond
reach.164 The Supreme Court announced in June 2017 that it would hear
the case and determine whether the ancient artifacts could be used to pay
the default judgment.165 After setting forth a sweeping history of foreign
sovereign immunity law, the Court unanimously held that the ancient
artifacts could not be used to pay the default judgment. 166
Two cases pending before the Supreme Court in the 2018–19 term may
further elucidate the scope of FSIA immunity. At issue in Republic of Sudan
v. Harrison167 is whether a plaintiff who sues a foreign state under FSIA
may effectuate service of legal process by mail sent to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s embassy in the
United States.168 Of significance to this Article is the perspective of the
United States. The case concerns a notorious 2000 al-Qaeda attack on the
U.S.S. Cole while refueling in Aden, Yemen, which killed seventeen
American sailors, injured forty-two more, and resulted in a default
judgment of $314 million in damages. 169 Nevertheless, the United States
filed an amicus curiae brief170 in support of Sudan arguing that allowing
service via embassies will generally undermine sovereign immunity and
embassy protections under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations and harm its ability to defend itself in foreign litigation,

163
See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that more
than a decade of litigation followed to attempt to collect the unpaid judgement from Iran).
164
See id. at 473.
165
See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326, 2327 (2017). See also Lawrence
Hurley, U.S. Top Court Takes up Fight over Ancient Persian Artifacts, REUTERS (June 27, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-takes-up-fight-overancient-persian-artifacts-idUSL1N1JO0MB [https://perma.cc/M99K-7CJN].
166
See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 826–27 (2018).
167
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 802 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2671
(2018). See also Adam Liptak, A Thought Experiment in Court Over How to Sue a Country, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, at A13 [hereinafter Liptak, Thought Experiment]; Robert Barnes, Supreme
Court Seems Divided on Whether Sudan Properly Served with USS Cole Lawsuits, WASH. POST
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courtseems-divided-on-whether-sudan-properly-served-with-uss-cole-lawsuits/2018/11/07/7a
b7c3d2-e2bf-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html?utm_term=.284e6e07f57b [https://perma.
cc/JGK3-F2AF].
168
Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 802 F.3d 399, 402, 405 (2d Cir. 2015).
169
Liptak, Thought Experiment, supra note 167.
170
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Republic of Sudan
v. Harrison, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 16-1094), 2018 WL 4043178, at *10–26.
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including the approximately 1000 lawsuits pending in over 100
countries.171
At issue in Jam v. International Finance Corp.172 is whether the
International Organizations Immunities Act,173 which grants commercial
organizations the “same immunity” granted to foreign governments,
must be interpreted consistent with the scope of immunity granted foreign
sovereigns when the Act was passed in 1945.174 Harmed fishermen and
farmers near the Tata Mundra Power Plant in India, financed by the
International Finance Corporation, contend that the Act must be
interpreted consistent with the evolution of immunity law under FSIA,
which does not currently extend to commercial acts.175
4.

Judicial Narrowing of the Alien Tort Statute

The human rights community widely views Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. as a catastrophic gate-closing ukase for greatly expanding the
“presumption against extraterritoriality” doctrine. 176 This doctrine
forecloses jurisdiction and thereby immunizes conduct outside the U.S.
unless Congress expressly states otherwise—language absent from the
1789 Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) enactment.177 Commentary on Kiobel is
expansive, including commentary by Justice Breyer, author of the main
concurring opinion.178 Justice Breyer’s concurrence rejected the concept of
universal jurisdiction, even if the alleged international torts rise to the
level of hostis humani generis or internationally condemned violations of

The specific immunity argument raised by the U.S. is whether Article 22 of the Vienna
Convention, which states that “[t]he premises of [the embassy] shall be inviolable,” prohibits
service in this manner. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(1), 23 U.S.T. 3237,
500 U.N.T.S. 106. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 16-1094), 2018 WL 4043178, at *20–
21.
172
Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).
173
22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).
174
Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
175
Id. at 704–05. See generally Richard Garnett, Precarious Employment? Varying Approaches
to Foreign Sovereign Immunity in Labor Disputes, 51 INT’L LAW. 25 (2018) (providing
background and application of the FSIA “commercial activity” exception to immunity).
176
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013). The Nigerian
plaintiffs in Kiobel alleged that the international oil corporation, which has extensive and
multifaceted operations in the United States, aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
the commission of multiple human rights violations against the local population in order to
advance oil exploration in the Ogoni River Delta region. Id. at 1662–63.
177
See supra note 176 and accompanying text. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Alien
Tort Statute grants subject matter jurisdiction over civil suits brought by aliens alleging
tortious violations of international treaties under customary international law. Id.
178
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
171
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law.179 Kiobel’s impact is significant because, since the landmark Filartiga
decision in 1980, federal courts had been, albeit with judicial croaks and
groans, slowly opening jurisdictional doors and expanding the scope of
international human rights claims actionable under the ATS to encompass
torture and related abuses, corporate connivance with governmental
human rights abuses, and even befoulment of the environment. 180 The
Supreme Court held earlier, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, that federal courts
were open to foreigners who claim they are the victims of human rights
abuses anywhere in the world if the egregious conduct violated norms of
international law and if the defendant is either present in the U.S. or has
significant interests in the U.S. to establish personal jurisdiction.181 PostKiobel, however, international human rights justice has been stymied by
deference to the power of foreign governmental interests and
international corporations and the ongoing failure of Congress to update
the 1789 enactment to reflect contemporary international entanglements
between countries in military and economic affairs. 182
The post-Kiobel legal tsunami of decisions dismissing human rights
cases against powerful corporate and governmental interests has
reverberated all the way to South Africa. The Khulumani Support Group
sued twenty banks and corporations in 2002—eleven years before Kiobel—
and alleged that corporate conduct during the apartheid era in South
Africa supported and enabled human rights abuses against the majority
black population.183 The Khulumani plaintiffs detailed the defendants’
support of South African industries that economically enriched and
entrenched the apartheid government and allegedly made these
defendants complicit in human rights abuses, which caused specific
See BREYER, supra note 122, at 134–64. See also BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 179–81.
BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 180. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)
(placing great importance on human rights, especially the right not to be tortured). The
holding was later codified by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, as a note in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1991). See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (codified as note in 28 U.S.C. § 1350). See also infra Section III.B.7 (discussing the Torture
Victim Protection Act).
181
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700–02 (2004). The ATS does not expressly
address who can be sued thereunder nor does it limit jurisdiction over any defendant
contingent on the physical location of the tort or the defendant. See BAZYLER, supra note 7, at
330.
182
In other relevant contexts, Congress has statutorily narrowed sovereign immunity. The
Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, sets forth a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that
allows individuals to pursue personal injury or death claims against the federal government
when caused by government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
183
See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See also
Apartheid Reparations Lawsuits (re So. Africa), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/apartheid-reparations-lawsuits-re-so-africa
[https://perma.cc/4YTH-GJ8B] (collecting analysis of other ATS lawsuits).
179
180
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injuries to the plaintiffs.184 During the protracted legal proceedings, Kiobel
was decided, and ultimately the Khulumani lawsuit was dismissed due to
failure to establish a sufficient United States nexus between the conduct of
the remaining defendants, IBM and Ford, and specific human rights
abuses by the former apartheid government. 185 Thus, international justice
for these apartheid victims was foreclosed. In an ironic later development,
the current South African government, controlled by the former
revolutionary African National Congress party, formally notified the
United Nations of its plan to leave the International Criminal Court
because it “is in conflict and inconsistent with” South African law granting
government officials “diplomatic immunity.” 186 Former Constitutional
Court of South Africa Justice Richard Goldstone starkly criticized this
post-revolutionary turn backward toward impunity as “unfortunate on
legal, moral and political grounds.” 187 Also, South African President Jacob
Zuma survived his eighth no-confidence vote with the support of African
National Congress National Assembly members, despite dozens of legal
investigations regarding corruption allegations that have not impacted his
absolute legal and political immunity. 188
Judicial principles of universal jurisdiction championed by domestic
courts in Spain and elsewhere are non-starters in the United States under
the ATS and otherwise, absent the fanciful idea that Congress will enact
184
See Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d at 334 (describing plaintiffs’ grievances against IBM).
Valparaiso University School of Law hosted a four-day symposium in 1987 entitled
“Perspectives on South African Liberation.” The symposium essays, edited by the author
and published by Hamline University School of Law in volume 5 of The Journal of Law and
Religion 259 (1987), addressed, inter alia, the intertwined governmental and corporate
foundation of apartheid, which was immune from legal challenge, and whether apartheid
positivist law was morally worthy of obedience.
185
See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissed by
Ntsebeza v. Ford Motor Co). See also Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d at 334.
186
Sewell Chan & Marlise Simons, South Africa to Withdraw from International Criminal
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/
world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html
[https://perma.cc/E8H8XNQ6]. See also Marlise Simons, South Africa Should Have Arrested Sudan’s President, I.C.C.
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/iccsouth-africa-sudan-bashir.html [https://perma.cc/T5JR-U9AW] (stating that South African
courts informed South African diplomats that they were required to arrest Omar Hassan alBashir).
187
Chan & Simons, supra note 186. Perhaps readers will recall the prescient lyrics of The
Who in Won’t Get Fooled Again: “Meet the new boss / same as the old boss.” THE WHO,
WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN (Track Records 1971).
188
See Gabrielle Steinhauser, South African President Survives a Strong Challenge, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 9, 2017, at A5. See also South African’s President Survives His Toughest Challenge Yet,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/
08/09/south-africas-president-survives-his-toughest-challenge-yet
[https://perma.cc/
UG3B-GBN8].
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specific statutory language to expand subject matter jurisdiction to
foreclose immunity for U.S. actors whose salacious international deeds are
outsourced to non-U.S. actors.189 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
recently resolved an appeal that consolidated five extremely procedurally
complex lawsuits that expressly raised the issue not reached in Kiobel of
whether corporations may ever be sued under the ATS. The Supreme
Court held in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC190 that foreign corporations could
not be defendants under the ATS.191 The majority (5-4) opinion by Justice
Kennedy traced, in great detail, the relevant history of Congressional and
Supreme Court developments since passage of the ATS.192 Of course, in
any case against a government or private actor in which subject matter
jurisdiction has been established, additional immunity and other defenses
await resolution.
A trial had been scheduled in September 2017 in Salim v. Mitchell to
determine whether two psychologists working under CIA contracts
should be held accountable under the ATCA for the torture of two former

The universal jurisdiction of Spanish courts was established in the Judicial Power
Organization Act No. 6/1985 of 1 July (Official Gazette No. 157 of 2 July). The act authorizes
Spanish jurisdiction where Spaniards or “foreigners outside the national territory” commit
certain egregious offenses. Scilingo remains the only case in which Spain has exercised its
universal jurisdiction and subsequently ordered a criminal sentence. S.T.S., Oct. 1, 2007
(R.G.D.,
No.
798)
(Spain)
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/
doc/sentenciats.html [https://perma.cc/62M8-T46S]. Mr. Scilingo received a 1084-year
sentence for crimes against humanity committed in Argentina, including genocide, 30 counts
of murder, 286 of torture, 255 of terrorism, and 93 of causing injury. Id. See also Aritz Parra,
NEWS,
Spain’s
National
Court
Drops
Probe
into
Syrian
Crimes,
FOX
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/07/21/spains-national-court-drops-probe-intosyrian-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/N75N-2K6X]. As of October 2017, over 470,000
people have been killed in the ongoing civil war in Syria, and nearly half the country’s
population has been displaced, yet only one human rights war-crime case has been brought,
in Spain, against Syrian governmental and military officials for well-documented human
rights atrocities committed during the initial six years of lawlessness. Id. However, a panel
of Spanish judges later decided that the Spanish National Court did not have jurisdiction to
investigate the case. Id. See also The Editorial Board, Frustration Over a War and Its Crimes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2017, at A18. The complex and frustrated U.N.-created entities charged
with investigating human rights abuses in Syria appear stymied. See also Nick CummingBruce, Ex-Judge Chosen by U.N. to Gather Evidence of Syria War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2017,
at A5 (reporting that a French judge will prepare evidence of war crimes committed in Syria);
Anne Barnard et al., As Atrocities Mount in Syria, Justice Seems Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2017, at A1 (revealing that only a few Syrian war crimes are being pursued by European
judges).
190
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018).
191
Id. at 1403.
192
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bars Human Rights Suits in the U.S. Against Foreign
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2018, at B2.
189
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detainees and the death of one detainee in secret prisons in Afghanistan. 193
Although the U.S. government and CIA officers enjoy sovereign and
qualified immunity, respectively, the court did not extend such immunity
to the private actors.194 Both sides made extensive arguments expressly
referencing German law during the Holocaust and the subsequent human
rights liability principles resulting from the Nuremberg trials. 195 The
district court denied the psychologists’ renewed motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction in August 2017 and reiterated that a jury would hear the
case.196 A confidential settlement was reached promptly thereafter.197 To
date, no one has been held legally accountable under the ATCA or
otherwise for torture and other human rights violations arising from the
“enhanced interrogation” policies and practices implemented in the
aftermath of September 11.198
5.

The Antiterrorism Act

Waldman v. PLO, another illustrative gate-closing case, concerned a
series of terrorist attacks in Israel that killed American and Israeli citizens
and resulted in a $655.5 million judgment under the Anti-Terrorism Act
following a seven-week trial on the merits against the Palestinian
Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization.199 However, the
Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1123–25 (E.D. Wash. 2016). See also Sheri Fink
& James Risen, Lawsuit Aims to Hold 2 Contractors Accountable for C.I.A. Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2016, at A10 (discussing the aim of Salim).
194
See Salim 183 F. Supp. 3d at 1130 (explaining qualified immunity for private actors).
195
See Sheri Fink, 2 Psychologists in C.I.A. Interrogations Can Face Trial, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2017, at A18 (offering information on public policy ideas developed after the
Nuremberg trials). See also M. Gregg Bloche, When Torture Becomes Science, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2017, at SR6 (providing a legal and psychiatric summary of case issues); Ariel Dorfman,
Shakespeare’s Torture Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2017, at SR8 (addressing Iago’s evil and the
necessity of retaining humanity when confronting evil).
196
See Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1133 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (E.D. Wash.
2017) (denying the psychologists’ motion for summary judgment and stating that similar
arguments were raised by defendants in a previous motion to dismiss); Larry Siems, Creators
of the CIA’s ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Program to Face Trial, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/aug/08/cia-torture-program-lawsuit-trialenhanced-interrogation [https://perma.cc/NY8U-QS6P].
197
See Sheri Fink, Ex-Detainees Reach Settlement With 2 Psychologists in C.I.A. Torture Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2017, at A12; Sara Randazzo, CIA Psychologists, Ex-Detainees, Reach
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2017, at A4.
198
One of the psychologists in Salim v. Mitchell published a book that explained the
program and noted that the CIA had awarded medals to the psychologists for their work.
See JAMES E. MITCHELL & BILL HARLOW, ENHANCED INTERROGATION: INSIDE THE MINDS AND
MOTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS TRYING TO DESTROY AMERICA (Crown Forum 2016).
199
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (codifying the Antiterrorism Act); Waldman v. PLO, 835
F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, Sokolow v. PLO, 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018). See also
193
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Second Circuit vacated the award and ordered that the lawsuit be
dismissed because of insufficient connection between the Palestinian
defendants and the United States to meet the jurisdictional demands of
the Anti-Terrorism Act.200
6.

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act

In 2016, Congress overrode a veto by President Obama to enact the
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which amends FSIA and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, to authorize
personal jurisdiction over foreign states and civil damages claims in
specified contexts.201 This legislation is poised to disrupt the longstanding
international law doctrine that shields foreign governments from
lawsuits, and it expressly authorizes families of victims of the September
11 terrorist attacks to sue the Saudi Arabian government for any official
conduct supportive of the alleged Saudi Arabian conspirators who had
connections with terrorist groups.202 However, the law has been criticized
for potentially opening judicial doors for foreign countries to sue U.S.
military personnel regarding military operations and other conduct
outside the U.S.203 This criticism, which was accepted by President
Obama, further illustrates why political and military opposition to
restricting governmental impunity and qualified immunity for
government and military actors will ever be in conflict with developing
civil society norms of human rights “from below.” 204
Benjamin Weiser, Court Throws Out $655.5 Million Terrorism Verdict Against Palestinian
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016, at A22.
200
See Waldman, 835 F.3d at 322. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2334; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S.
429, 434 (1929) (setting forth “minimum contacts” analysis to determine if a sufficient
connection to a particular forum exists for purposes of litigation).
201
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1605B. See also Mark Mazzetti, New Law Shifts Fight on
Claims for 9/11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2016, at A1 (examining the interaction between
the veto and 9/11 lawsuits); Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis,
Congress Allows Saudis to be Sued Over 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2016, at A1
(expounding upon the consequences of the vote to override President Obama’s veto of the
bill, which allows families of 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia for any role undertaken in the
plot). See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill, but Congressional Override
Is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2016, at A1.
202
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (placing responsibility on foreign states for terrorist attacks in the
United States). See also The Editorial Board, The Risks of Suing the Saudis for 9/11, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2016, at A24 (discussing the problems associated with suing the Saudi Arabian
government).
203
See The Risks of Suing the Saudis, supra note 202.
204
See Brother Against Brother, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2017, at 72 (summarizing historical
analysis dating to the Roman Empire regarding this perpetual conflict and the incomplete
mission of law to contextually balance these irreconcilable and competing interests of
governmental inviolability and individual rights).
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Ongoing U.S. sanctions against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism
were addressed by the International Court of Justice in Alleged Violations
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights,205
wherein the U.S. argued that Iran’s continuing request for sanctions relief
under international law would “cause irreparable prejudice to the
sovereign rights of the United States to pursue its policy towards Iran.” 206
Nevertheless, the court ordered the U.S. to remove any sanctions that
impede exportation of goods required for humanitarian assistance to
Iran.207
7.

Sloping Toward Impunity: The Torture Victim Protection Act, The
Detainee Treatment Act, and Judicial Foreclosure of a Right of Action
Thereunder

Another prominent human rights case and other related precedents
illustrate the judicial minting of a statutory license to torture due to the
award of wholesale immunity for such conduct. 208 In Vance v. Rumsfeld,
statutory damages claims stemming from the Iraq War were brought
against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who allegedly
created policies that authorized and resulted in the torture of U.S. civilians
in Iraq.209 The sharply divided en banc Seventh Circuit (8-3) held that
neither an implied statutory nor common-law claim for damages should
be created under Bivens.210 Furthermore, even if such a claim existed
under the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), it could not be brought
205
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order, 2018 I.C.J. 175 (Oct. 3). Iran claims
that sanctions violate this Treaty between Iran and the United States, 8 U.S.T 899, which was
signed at Tehran, Iran, on August 15, 1955.
206
Id. at 24, ¶ 87.
207
Id. at 26–27, ¶¶ 98, 102.
208
28 U.S.C. § 1350. A cause of action was created for U.S. citizens, and foreign nationals,
to file torture or extrajudicial killing lawsuits. Id. See also 10 U.S.C. § 801; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000dd–2000dd-1 (codifying the Detainee Treatment Act).
209
See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (explaining the torture
practices used against the defendants). This decision was consistent with other prior
decisions that addressed analogous claims. See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 562
(4th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d
762, 792–93 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571–81 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
For the interested reader, the plaintiffs’ complaint was detailed in 387 paragraphs over 79
pages. The initial merits panel decision in Vance set forth 81 pages of analysis. That decision
was vacated and replaced by the en banc opinion that covered 83 pages. But the majority
opinion’s consideration of the plaintiffs’ torture and suffering required only four pages of
attention.
210
See Vance, 701 F.3d at 201–02. Although the Detainee Treatment Act authorizes criminal
prosecution and may have limited civil application to enforce injunctions, the enactment
expressly blocks damages liability.
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against Secretary Rumsfeld.211
The majority opinion by Judge
Easterbrook, which reads like a positivist government’s dream brief, left
no doubt that even if the torture claim against Secretary Rumsfeld was
statutorily authorized, it would not survive the “clearly established law”
high hurdle of qualified immunity because “a public official's inability to
ensure that all subordinate federal employees follow the law has never
justified personal liability.”212 Chief Judge Wood’s concurring opinion
expressly and quite summarily concluded that Secretary Rumsfeld “is
entitled to qualified immunity.”213
The dissent flailed at the sweeping scope of immunity “granting the
entire U.S. military an exemption from all Bivens liability, even to
civilians.”214 The absolute civil immunity awarded to U.S. military and
civilian personnel was, the dissent argued, in direct opposition to the
liability principles of the TVPA, which, analogously, authorizes civil
remedies for: (1) a victim of Syrian military torture, if the torturer is
located in the U.S.; and (2) family survivors, if the torture results in
death.215 These remedies, the dissent stated, apply to victims of torture by
every government in the world, except one: “civilian U.S. citizens who
are tortured or worse by our own military have no such remedy. That
disparity attributes to our government and to our legal system a degree of
hypocrisy that is breathtaking.”216
8.

Even the United Nations Enjoys Immunity for Its Own Human Rights
Violations

United States federal courts may be closed to human rights cases
brought against the United Nations—the enshrined protector of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—because of immunity.217 In
Georges v. United Nations, tort and contract claims arising from the tragic
211
See Editorial, Getting Away with Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at A28 (criticizing
the opinion’s cynical analysis of the defendant’s significant burden of responding to such
lawsuits). Donald Rumsfeld was already retired from office when the lawsuit was filed.
212
Vance, 701 F.3d at 203. It is true that high level government officials are not vicariously
liable for the conduct of their subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).
However, they may be individually liable if they, inter alia, directly supervise illegal conduct
or fail to supervise or train subordinates to prevent such conduct. See generally MARTIN A.
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 7.19(c), at 7-239 (4th ed.
2010).
213
Vance, 701 F.3d at 206.
214
Id. at 212 (Hamilton, C.J., dissenting).
215
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, §§ 2(a), 3(b) (setting forth jurisdiction for an alien’s tort
suit).
216
Vance v. Rumsfeld. 701 F.3d 193, 211 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, C.J., dissenting).
217
See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
(ensuring rights for a standard of living).
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2010–13 cholera outbreak in Haiti were dismissed because the United
Nations enjoyed legal immunity under various international
agreements.218 The outbreak, caused by atrocious U.N. sanitation
practices, killed more than 9000 innocent civilians and infected over
800,000 people.219 Still, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal because
Article II of the U.N. Charter enshrines U.N. immunity unless expressly
waived.220 Because Article II explicitly details the only restriction on U.N.
immunity, the Second Circuit determined that immunity must triumph
over the Haitian victims.221 It is clear from Georges that the sweeping
immunity held by the United Nations often will present an
insurmountable hurdle for victims of human rights abuses—even when
those abuses are clearly caused by the paramount international
organization entrusted to advance human rights. 222
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has primarily focused on judicial foreclosure of civil and
human rights claims based on judge-created doctrinal immunity policies
that mirror asserted governmental interests. In particular, judicial
analysis of the qualified immunity doctrine inherently requires a de
minimis focus on the plaintiff’s interests in favor of perfunctory dismissal
of all claims that are not historically well established, regardless of the
gravamen of the injuries claimed. This doctrine and omnipotent
sovereign immunity enactments, coupled with wholesale judicial
expansion thereof, undermine core principles of remedial justice and
significantly impede the progress of law to the detriment of justice “from
218
Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 88, 90
(2d Cir. 2016).
219
See Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (explaining how many Haitians were infected with
cholera); Georges, 834 F.3d at 90. See also G.A. Res. 217 (XXV) 1, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (enshrining, inter alia, every person’s right to a standard of
living adequate for health and well-being); UN Immunity Beats Back Legal Claims by Haitian
Cholera Victims, Battle Continues, ABA NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.american
bar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/02/un_immunity_beatsba.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y5N-GTCQ] (discussing the fight of Haiti’s cholera victims).
220
See Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 21 U.S.T. 569, 25
(1970)) (granting legal immunity, in every country, to the United Nations).
221
See id. The United Nations must, in an affirmative act of secular positivist zimsum, deign
to expressly waive its immunity. That the U.N. did not do so in the Haitian case is a travesty
of justice.
222
What would Eleanor Roosevelt, who was unanimously chosen to chair the UN
Committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the multitude of
other prominent human rights advocates who advanced the human rights mission of the
United Nations say about this impunity? See generally Richard N. Gardner, Eleanor Roosevelt’s
Legacy: Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/10/
opinion/eleanor-roosevelt-s-legacy-human-rights.html [https://perma.cc/5QFJ-KR2Z].
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below.” This legal reality poses a paramount and multifaceted future
challenge for civil and human rights advocates. Significant progress in
U.S. civil rights law in recent decades has advanced across a wide
spectrum of substantive law. However, securing remedial damages
justice against government entities and actors in all substantive fields of
civil rights and human rights law remains a daunting challenge. May the
legal advocates for victims of governmental misconduct ever be immune
from the Hydra-like limitations on their pursuit of justice for those who
suffered “from below.”

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 3

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/3

